INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Ihe safe and effective use of many products is predominantly determined by the decisions and actions people make. In general, the decisions and actions are appropriate, but occsionally errors occur that result in serious accidents. Warings provide information intended to reduce such erros and are often explicitly designed into products. Machines in complex human-machine systems have placed particular emphasis on providing waring information to the operator when unusual conditions arise. There is little question that by doing so they have often increased the safety of such systems.
Unfortunately, the emergence of products liability and the role of the courts in judging the adequacy of warnings has caused the majority of recent attention to be focused upon warning labels and signs. Part of the problem is that there currently are few operationally applicable and objective criteria for deciding whether or not to apply an explicit warning label or sign. Manufacturers are now applying legalistic or litigation preventive criteria such as "warn against ALL hazards with explicit waring labels or signs" when designing products. The resulting trend toward the nonselective reliance on warning labels and signs as safety devices may ultimately be counterproductive to safety in general [1] .
From an engineering viewpoint, the primary reason to provide safety information is to reduce accidents by informing people of risks. The primary assumption underlying this approach is that people's safety-related decisions and actions can be improved by providing information that instructs, persuades, informs, or wars. As such, it is assumed that people will both notice and heed these various forms of safety information. However, little research has measured the effectiveness of warnings in terms of safety-related behavior. Furthenmore, the majority of currently available guidelines for warning design have focused on perceptual issues and severely neglected decision-making and other cognitive aspects of human behavior. Consequendy, just as safety communication campaigns in the 1960's were often assumed without foundation to be effective [2] , [3] , waring signs and labels are often alleged to be effective or ineffective on the basis of little or no research.
To evaluate the effectiveness of warning signs and labels, it is necessary to describe in a organized way the complicated process that takes place when an effective sign or label prevents accidents. One useful approach is to describe the waming process in terms of human information processing theory [1] . In the model they propose, the warning process is described as a sequence of eight stages: 1) exposure to the warning stimulus, 2) attention and active processing of the warning stimulus, 3) comprehension and agreement with the warning message, 4) retaining the message in memory, 5) retrieval of the message at the time it is relevant, 6) deciding to respond consistently with the message, 7) performing the response, and 8) effectiveness of the response in preventing accidents.
This approach naturaly results in an emphasis on detamining the degree to which warnings impact decision-making. Although the available literature is limited, there is evidence that warings should be selective. Part of the reason is that people often seem to ignore warnings. For example, in a classic experiment, none of 100 subjects noticed the explicit warning labels placed on amrs, one of which was the warning label supplied by the manufactur [4] . In a study of 52 subjects using 60 different consumer products, it was found that, 34% of the time, subjects stated they would not read any of the instructions that came with a product; 53% of the ime the subjects said they would read all the instructions [5] . The average viewing time of waring information in tobacco advertisements by adolescents has been shown to be only 8% of the total viewing ime, and in 43.6% of the cases the warning was not viewed at all [6] . It has also been found that only 42% of women surveyed noticed a tampon warning when changing from one brand to another [7] .
Several additional experiments indicate that even waffic signs are frequently filtered. In one study, it was found that 15% to 30% of motorists did not recall seeing forest fire safety signs [8] . The average recall by motorists of the last two road signs they passed (they were stopped 200 meters away from the signs) has been as low as 4.5% and 16.5% during the day and night, respectively [9] . Other research showed sign recall levels varying from 21% to 79%
for motorists stopped 710 meters after passing a traffic sign [1OJ.
The studies of traffic signs provide the clearest evidence of filtring, since in a related study motorists failed to notice only 2.95% of the passed signs when they were explicitly asked to look and then report the signs to an investigator in the back seat of the car [11] . These studies do not, however, determine when warnings will attract attention rather than be ignored. Many factors can theoretically influence this process. Among such factors are the perceived risk and importance of the warning. One of the most salient findings is that people are more likely to take safety precautions if they believe the danger is large. This principle was confirmed in an experiment where subjects were more likely to behave in accordance with a warning label on a power saw when it was perceived as being highly dangerous [12] . One review of the research regarding the response of people to volcano, flood, and nuclear power plant-related warnings, concluded that people's belief that the danger was real (i.e. after officials or police provided warnings) was a very major determinant of behavior. If people didn't believe the warning (i.e. when newspapers reported problems), they were much less likely to behave in accordance with the waming [13] . Other researchers have emphasized that credible sources are more likely to be persuasive [14] . Similar effects have been shown for public utility customers, where messages stated to come from the public service commission were more likely to elicit effects than those from the electrical utlfity [15] .
From a decision making perspective, warnings may also be ignored if they seem to be irrelevant to task performance. Experienced workers in particular might be more prone to ignore warning-related informnation because of past. benign experience, in which accidents rarely occur. Along these lines, it has been hypothesized that people may rationally ignore safety-related advice when the probability of an accident is perceived to be low [16] .
Experinmental support for both theories is given by results where the tendency to mad insructions increased when people were unfamiliar with a product or when a product was perceived to be complex, unsafe, or expensive. Complexity and frequency of use correlated significantly with the propensity to read instructions (r = 0 .47 for the former and r = -0.24 for the later) [5] . Similar results have been obtained for the reading of waring labels [12] . Drivers have also been found to be most likely to recall seeing raffic signs perceived as being important [10] .
Another concern is that the excessive provision of warnings may result in information overload. There is eidence that increasing the number of items on a label or sign can cause a division of processing time among the items presented. For example, it has been found that subjects rernember important product-related information better, when fewer items are listed on labels [17] . Other research has shown that false alarms have been associated with negative perceptions of pilots toward ground fault waring systems [18] .
On the basis of such research findings, it has been concluded that there is a need to selectively provide critical information in all forms of warnings, including waring signs or labels [1] . However, the experimental evidence is not as useful as might be desired. One major shortcoming is that the experimental data does not define the concept of selectivity precisely, much less how selective wamings should be. The experimental evidence might also be misinterpretable as implying that warnings are never of value. This paper is intended to go beyond the experimental evidence and show that the need for selectivity is based on fundamental theoretical grounds. Most importantly, it is oriented towards the ultimate development of an objective design methodology in which the optimum level of selectivity is precisely defined. In attempting to attain this goal, it provides a new and original perspective on the role of the designer.
In this new perspective, the designer becomes a consultant who provides information through an intermediary (the product warning) to the user. However, once the product is in use, the product warning becomes in effect the consultant. From the modeling perspective, the waring and user becomne decision makers who jointly try to make a optimal decision. The decision, of course, is one of determining whether danger is or is not actually present, in a situation where both failures to identify a hazard and false alarms have associated costs. The critical question to the designer is to determine how selective should the warning be to minimize the expected cost to the user, as a function of 1) the false alarms and correct identifications made by the warning, and 2) the marginal probability of the danger being present The selectivity issue, when posed in this way, falls within the problem of optimal distributed decision making, as discussed below. As i7 varies from zero to infinity, a curve describing the probability ofdetection (i.e., the probability of decidingu = 1, when HI is true) versus the probability offalse alam (ie., the probability of deciding u = 1, when Ho is true) is obtained parametrically. This is called the Receiver Operating Characterissic (ROC) curve and is the cornerstone of mathematical binary hypothesis testing, since it offers a complete description of the DMs [29] . One 
The problem of distributed decision maing in a hypothesis testing environment has atracted considerable interest during the past decade. This framework was selected because it combines two desirable attributes; the mathematical problems are easy to describe so that researchers from diverse disciplines can understand the models and their conclusions; also, the problems have trivial centalized counterparts, so that all the difficulties arise because of the decentralization of the decision making process. On the other hand, these problems are also known to become computationally intractable (NP-hard) even for a small number of DMs and a small number of comnmunication messages [ 19] .
The Bayesian decentralized detection problem was first considered in [20] , where the optimality of constant threshold strategies was established. Several generalizations of the basic detection model have appeared in [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] and in [26] , where the infinite tandem team was considered. Different team architectures, for the Bayesian case, are compared in [27] . An excellent and thorough oveview of the field was presented in [28] .
The distributed binary hypothesis testing model for our problem is defined as follows. There are two hypotheses Ho and H1 with known prior probabilities P(Ho) > C and P(HI) > C respectively, and the team (organization) consists of two DMs; one is called the primary DM and the other is called the consultant DM (Figure 1 
where:
A(y,P) = P(yv HO)
is the likelihood ratio of DM n (n = p, c), and where 7 was defined in (1), with PD and Pk respectively the probability of detection and probability of false alarm for the primary DM when uc = i was sent by the consultant DM (i = 0, 1) and, Pp and Pc respectively the probability of detection and probability of false alarm for the consultant DM. and the other operating point of the primary DM (P°, P4) is at (0,0) (again, this threshold will never be used, since uC = 0 is never communicated by the consultant DM in this case). The optimality condition for the consultant DMs operating point is:
PC
Then it can be shown that when the primary DM receives u-= ml, it will always be more likely to decide up = 0 and when he receives uF = M2, it will always be more likely to decide up = 1. Hence the interpretation of ml as 0 and of m2 as 1. 
( 1 1) 1 (a). The Operating Point of the Consultant DM Note that the team ROC curve depends not only upon the characteristics ("expertise') of the individual DMs, but also on the particular way that they have been constrained to interact (the team or organization architecture). That is, the team ROC curve depends on both the particular form of the ROC curves of the individual DMs and on which DM has been designated to be the primary DM.
The Consultant DM as a Warning Message
Equations (2) and (3) give the optimal actions of the primary DM, given that the consultant DM employs (PF, PD) as its operating point; that is, (2) and (3) indicate the optimal way in which the primary DM can benefit from the consultant's communication. This does not depend on whether the operating point is optimal or suboptimal from the consultant DM's point of view, or, for that matter, on whether (PI, PD) was selected according to some arbitrary rule.
Therefore, the team of Figure 1 can also be viewed in a different context; the consultant DM provides a warning to the primary DM about some imminent danger (represented by hypothesis Hi). The team still consists of cooperating "decision makers", but now the consultant DM does not strive to optinize its decision; rather, some extemal conditions to the team may dictate the operating point of the consultant DM (for example, a law that requires that a warning label or sign always be present). The primary DM still optimally combines its personal observation with the communication from the consultant DM, so as to optimize the objective function (i.e., the expected cost of the team decision). Therefore, only (2) and (3) will be necessarily satisfied.
Suppose that the decision threshold is given to be tl*. Consider the effects of the movement of the consultant DMfs operating point along the ROC curve of the consultant DM (Figure 2) . Suppose that the operating point of the consultant DM is at (0,O); this implies that, independent of its observation y,, the consultant DM is always sending u, = 0 to the primary DM. Then, the opdmal operating point (PFt PA) of the primary DM is at (1,1) (but, this is never used, since uc = 1 is never communicated by the consultant DM), and the other operating point of the primary DM (PF, PD) is at (P;, PD), where (PF;, PD) is the maximum likelihood operating point of the primary DM if he was deciding in isolation for the same value of q*. That is, in this case, the primary DM completely disregards the message from the consultant DM, and makes the exact same decision that it would be mnakng ff it operated alone optimarly.
Similarly, when the operating point of the consultant DM is at (1,1) the operating point (PF, PD) of the primary DM is at (P4, PD) We first consider the team probabilities of false alarm which is given by (9) . As was already discussed in the previous section, assuming that the threshold 17 remains constant throughout, at both boundary points of the consultant DM (namely, (0,0) and (1,1) ), the probability of false alarm of the team is PF, where PF is the maximum likelihood probability of false alarm of the primary DM, for the given t7. We would like to determine whether PF, the team probability of false alarm changes in a concave way with PF, the probability of false alarm of the consulting DM. For this, we first need to determine whether the second partial derivative of PF with respect to PF is negative. Then:
apt -E(l-P,)Po +P] - We will only show that the partial derivative of PF with respect to PF, is negative, because the proof for the other is very similar.
Because of the concavity of the consultant's ROC curve, as increases the ratio:
1-PF decreases as well. Consequently, the threshold T70 of the primary DM (given by (2)) increases. Because of the property of the tangent to the ROC curve and of the concavity of the ROC curve, we obtain that P? decreases which in turn implies that the partial derivative of PF, with respect to PF is indeed negative. Still, the signs of the second derivatives cannot be determined as they depend on the particular shape of the ROC curves of the DMs. Thus, PF cannot be shown to be concave with respect to P% In fact, examples exist to show that it is not concave.
This results implies that, as the probability of false alarm of the warning message varies, no a priori inferences can be made about the change of the probability of false alarm of the primary DM; the probability of false alarm of the primary DM will not change in a nice and predictable pattern. A similar result can be derived for the probability of detecton of the primary DM.
Conclusions
It is clear from the discussion of section 2.2 that, if the primary DM behaves optimally, the permanent presence (or absence) of a warning sign does affect its behavior. Consequently, the system that consists of the warning message and the primary DM performs suboptimally, because the warning message is effectively ignored. There are two different ways to realize this. First, the presence of the consultant DM (i.e., warning mechanism) does not ameliorate the quality of the decision of the primary DI; the team operating point is the point (PF PS), which can be achieved by the primary DM working in isolation. Second, it can also be seen mathematically since at the points (PF,P',) = (0,0) and (PF,PA) = (1,1), the necessary optimality condition (11) is not satisfied.
Therefore, even if the waming mechanism can not or does not optimize the performance of its decision, warnings should be administered selectively in order to be effective; otherwise, (12) assuming that DMs are optmizers, wamings wil not have any effect on the decision of the primary DM as they wil be ignored.
The final result should be especially important in the design of warnings because it seems logical that, in order to increase the probability of detection (decrease the probability of false alarm) of the primary DM, the probability of detection of the waring has to increase (the probability of false alarm has to decrease). But it was shown that, as the probability of detection (false alarm) of the warning increases, it does not necessarily cause the probability of detection (false alarm) of the waring-primary team to incrse as well. Therefore, in order to modify the level of the performance (i.e., the operating point) of some primary DM in a desired way, the designer of the warning needs to take into consideration both the particular characteristics (i.e., the ROC curve) and the current level of performance of the primary DM.
